ハナ「先生、キッズ何とかって名前は止めます」
私「おー？」
ハナ「そこで新しい名前を考えました」
私「おー」
ハナ「私達のアイデアではありません」
私「おー？」
ハナ「長年の夢でありながら日の目をみない構想です」
私「おー」
ハナ「ケンちゃんがワシントンDCでロビー活動に連れて行ってもらったそうです」
私「おー？」
ハナ「国連緊急平和部隊という構想です」
私「おおーっっ」
ハナ「別名ユネップス、UNEPS: United Nations Emergency Peace Serviceといいます」
私はあまりの驚きにキッズの顔をぼんやり眺めていたが、とつぜんこみ上げてくるものを感じた。
私「うっうっ...」
ハナ「先生泣いてるんですか？」
私「いや風邪だ」
ハナ「やだー先生泣いてる！どうしたんですか？」
私「花粉症だ」
ハナ「泣いてる！」
私「お前らがようやく予習をするようになったから涙腺がおかしくなったのだ」
ハナ「えー、UNEPSって先生の講義にでてくるんですか？」
私「お前らがUNEPSに行き着いたなら、今日の特別ゲストはブライアン・アークハート卿だ」
アークハート「キッズの諸君グッドモーニング」
一同「うぉーいきなり出た！しかもハーイ・ベイビーってのりじゃない！」
私「アークハート卿は国連事務次長時代から長年UNEPS構想を進めようとしている人だ。UNEPSの第一人者といっても良い」
ハナ「嬉しい！お話聞けるのね！」
私「ブライアン、キッズにUNEPSの話をしてやってくれ」
アークハート「In 1948, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, proposed during a commencement speech at Harvard the development of a small, dedicated UN force to deal with the violent and chaotic conditions in Jerusalem. Perhaps unwisely, he called it a “United Nations Legion.” ..」
私「自動翻訳機が故障だ！」
イチロー「アンポリの妨害だ！」
アンポリ「みゃー」
アークハート「..In any case, the proposal was greeted with thunderous silence from the permanent members of the Security Council; even the United States and the USSR agreed that it was a terrible idea. The violence in Jerusalem continued.
UN peacekeeping came into full bloom with the 1956 Suez crisis and the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I). That force was de- ployed, due to the leadership and determination of Dag Hammarskjold and Ralph Bunche, within eight days of the General Assembly’s decision to establish it. The early peacekeeping forces of the Cold War period were put into the field with similar speed, the record being seventeen hours for UNEF II (to preserve a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel) in 1973. Although the political stakes were often very high, those early forces were less complex than the post-Cold-War multifunctional operations that were later deployed within the frontiers of a single disturbed country. Except for the 1960 Congo operation, these early forces had little or no humanitarian responsibilities. Equally important, they dealt only with governments and national forces and were deployed with the agreement of those governments as soon as a cease-fire was in place.」
私「アンポリ、こっちおいで」
アンポリ「みゃー」
アークハート「..Although in the early days of its existence a standing rapid deploy- ment force was accepted without major criticism from states parties, such a force became really indispensable when, in the 1990s, the Security CouncilTo PrevenT Genocide and crimes aGainsT HumaniTy
agreed to set up seventeen multifunctional peacekeeping/humanitarian missions in quick succession. The role of these operations was far more complex than the original peacekeeping operations, and the humanitarian crises facing most of them meant that even a month or two of delay in de- ployment was devastating not only for the victims, but also to the mission’s effectiveness and subsequent authority. Moreover, very few of their contin- gents were trained in the fundamental tasks of stopping random violence and dealing with chaos and disorder. This was why situations like that in Sierra Leone, where the rebel faction more or less successfully immobilized a UN force, could easily develop.」
ケンジ「先生！」
私「早くアンポリをどかせ！」
ケンジ「いいです、アークハート卿には最後まで続けてもらいましょう。翻訳は私が明日までにやっておきます！」
私「おー、そうしてくれるかケンジ君！」
と、私はがっちりケンジの手を握る。
ケンジ「先生きもちわるいです。手を離して下さい」
アークハート「The failure to deploy forces in emergency situations can start a chain reaction of disaster, loss of life, and misery. However, late deployment of a mission with forces untrained for the tasks at hand can create an equally devastating humanitarian situation. In her recent, remarkable book, The Turbulent Decade, Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees in the 1990s, describes vividly what the absence of trained forces can mean for a large refugee population in whose camps there is no one to keep order or stop factional abuse. The post-Rwandan-genocide refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region led to homicidal chaos that has so far cost over four million lives as well as many millions of dollars in relief aid and general economic loss. Tragedy in the camps continues despite the eventual arrival of a UN peacekeeping force. Much of this might have been avoided if, in the early stages, Ogata’s pleas for immediate military assistance had not been ignored.
I have mentioned this one example because it helps address some of the most common objections to a standing rapid deployment force or, as it is called in this book, an Emergency Peace Service. There are several com- mon objections to this idea, as well as one seldom expressed but very im- portant. The first common objection is related to expense. Certainly even a small standing force would be quite expensive by United Nations standards, though it would still be exponentially less costly than prolonged disasters like the continuing tragedy in the Great Lakes region—in lives, in economic and social disruption and in the cost of humanitarian and other assistance year after year, including at present a UN peacekeeping force that shows no sign of leaving any time soon.
Another popular argument against a standing emergency service is grounded in a belief that “standby arrangements” with governments can and should be enlisted to handle these tasks. That, unfortunately, is not
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a uniTed naTions emerGency Peace service
always true. In 1994, there were more than twenty standby arrangements with governments for the provision of peacekeeping forces. Not one could be activated successfully when the Security Council belatedly decided that something ought to be done about the Rwandan genocide. Later on, when Sadako Ogata appealed for help in controlling the very large refugee camps set up outside the borders of Rwanda, only one standby agreement could be activated, and that for so short a time that Ogata ended up asking president Mobutu of Zaire, who was about to be overthrown, for assistance from the Zairean army. Any government has a perfect right not to send its troops into disagreeable and dangerous situations, which is more often than not what the UN has to deal with. Only a professional, specially trained, standing UN force at the full disposal of the Security Council can be absolutely relied on to respond with the necessary speed in such situations. At present, this does not exist. As Kofi Annan once said, the UN is the only fire brigade in the world that has to acquire a fire engine after the fire has started.
However, the most basic objection to a standing UN peace service is seldom expressed publicly. Protection of national sovereignty is a concern that very often limits the ability of the UN to do the right thing in the right way at the right time. Fear of any UN development that may erode national sovereignty has always limited the UN’s capacity for intervention. For this same reason, governments have been acutely cautious about expanding the Secretary-General’s sphere of authority. A standing emergency peace ser- vice would certainly increase the Security Council’s capacity to react quickly and effectively in an emergency, rather than go through the pedestrian and often untimely and unsatisfactory process of setting up a traditional peace- keeping force. Nevertheless, it seems as though it will take more disasters and many more debates before the governments that object to a standing UN rapid deployment force can be convinced that saving lives and stopping incipient disasters before they run out of control is more important, and far less dangerous, than any possible threat to national sovereignty.
Meanwhile, it is vitally necessary that the concept and the practical plan for making an emergency peace service a reality be kept alive. That is the crucial importance of this book.* The basic proposal begins by stat- ing, “Because governments have not created the necessary UN capability, the responsibility for breathing life into the UN Emergency Peace Service now lies with civil society, working with allies in the UN and interested gov- ernments.” This venture is of the greatest importance both to the UN as a responsible institution and to the millions as of yet unknown, innocent vic-
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To PrevenT Genocide and crimes aGainsT HumaniTy
tims who might, in the future, be saved by this essential addition to the UN’s capacity to act on their behalf. Like many visionary ideas, there are several plausible objections to a UN Emergency Peace Service, or whatever it might finally be called. Nevertheless, there is one overwhelming argument for it. It is desperately needed, and it is needed as soon as possible.」
アンポリ「みゃー」
アークハート「それではキッズ諸君さようなら」
続く
犬塚直史